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INTRODUCTION

In 1960, then Associate Justice Robert W. Calvert penned what
has become the most influential law review article ever written
concerning the standard and scope of evidentiary review of jury
verdicts under Texas law.' Following another important article written
by Associate Justice W. St. John Garwood,2 which was concerned
primarily with the significant differences between legal and factual
sufficiency review of jury findings, the Calvert article was designed to
inform and, in fact, set the standard and scope of evidentiary review in
* Chief Justice John and Lena Hickman Distinguished Faculty Fellow and
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. See generally Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence"
Points of Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1960) (discussing the standard and scope of
evidentiary review of jury verdicts under Texas law).
2. See generally W. St. John Garwood, The Question of Insufficient Evidence on
Appeal, 30 TEX. L. REV. 803 (1952) (concerning the differences between legal and factual
sufficiency review of jury findings).
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Texas courts for more than thirty years.

Among other things, the Calvert article explained that when
considering a legal sufficiency complaint, in order to review the

evidence in its most favorable light in support of the verdict, a Texas
court must consider only the evidence and inferences supporting the
jury finding in question, disregarding all contrary evidence and
inferences.3 Justice Calvert's article influenced many Texas Supreme

Court opinions to define the scope of review in this way.4 By the late
1990s, however, courts and commentators in Texas began to
reexamine the standards and scope of legal sufficiency review. Some

commentators and jurists suggested that in another line of cases,5 the

Texas Supreme Court had expanded the scope of legal sufficiency

review and its own powers of judicial review without expressly
repudiating the traditional approach.6 Nonetheless, despite other
significant changes in the process of evidentiary review,' including the

recognition of an exception to the limited scope of review for
undisputed evidence,' it seemed reasonably clear that the traditional
scope of "no evidence review" had not been modified or replaced with
another standard as the twentieth century came to a close. 9 That is no
longer so.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court has embraced an important
recapitulation of the scope of evidentiary review in cases governed by

3. See Calvert, supra note 1, at 364 (citing Cartwright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 50708,171 S.W. 696, 698 (1914)).
4. See, e.g., Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965) ("In deciding that
question [i.e., legal sufficiency of the evidence], the appellate court must consider only the
evidence and the inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and
inferences to the contrary.").
5. See, e.g., Harbin v. Seale, 461 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. 1970) ("[A]II evidence must
be considered in a light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been
rendered, and every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in
such party's favor.").
6. See W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 47879 (1998); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Gonzalez, 9 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, no pet.).
7. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1497, 1498, 1507-16 (2000). Statistics concerning reversal rates of judgments
rendered on jury verdicts seemed to support the interim conclusion that significant changes
had been made in the process of judicial review because more cases were reversed on no
evidence grounds than in prior years. See also Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Reasons for
Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 434-35, 444 (2003); cf.
Susan L. Gellis, Reasons for Case Reversal in Texas: An Analysis, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 299,
301 (1985).
8. See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castafieda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 194-95 (Tex. 1998).
9. Id.
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the preponderance of the evidence standard of review." A similar
approach has been applied by the court to cases controlled by the
clear and convincing evidence standard of review." This article
explores and explains these important developments.
II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW
A.

TraditionalTexas Standards

The traditional Texas standard and scope of legal sufficiency
review is prescribed in Judge Calvert's 1960 article as follows:
"No evidence" points must, and may only, be sustained when
the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a
complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the
only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d)
the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital
fact.
...[I]n deciding "no evidence" points in situation (c) [the
evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
scintilla] ...

the courts follow the further rule of viewing the

evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding of
the vital fact, considering only the evidence and the inferences
which support the finding and rejecting the evidence and the
inferences which are contrary to the finding. 2
Because most cases are governed by the "scintilla rule"
formulation, which applies to challenges made to affirmative findings
on which the verdict winner had the burden of persuasion, this scope
of review has commonly been regarded as the general rule.13 A similar
approach has been applied by Texas appellate courts to Judge
Calvert's situation (d), which applies if the party with the burden of
persuasion on an issue challenges a jury's negative finding by
contending that the evidence conclusively establishes an affirmative

10. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810-28 (Tex. 2005).
11. See, e.g., id. at 817; Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 628-30 (Tex.
2004).
12. Calvert, supra note 1, at 364.
13. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. 1998); Cont'l
Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444,450 (Tex. 1996).
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finding.' 4 In this situation, the record is first examined for evidence
that supports the failure to find. But "[i]f there is no evidence to
support the fact finder's [negative] answer, then secondly, the entire
record must then be examined to see if the contrary [affirmative]
proposition is established as a matter of law."' 5
Both of these methods of reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence are designed to prevent the reviewing court from weighing
the evidence by requiring the court to focus on the evidence that
supports the finding without viewing it through the prism of the entire
record, which may include evidence opposing the finding.16 Both
require contrary evidence to be disregarded in determining whether
any evidence supports the affirmative or negative finding, so that the
record evidence is in fact viewed "in its most favorable light in support
of the finding."17 Thus, the scope of legal sufficiency review has
differed from the scope of factual insufficiency review in which a court
of appeals is required to consider all of the evidence to decide if the
evidence supporting a finding is so weak or the evidence to the
contrary is so overwhelming that the finding should be set aside and a
new trial ordered. 18
Although Judge Calvert's 1960 law review article does not
mention it, more than a decade before the Calvert article a significant
exception had been recognized by the Texas Supreme Court
concerning the jury's ability to disregard "undisputed" evidence. For
example, in Texas & New OrleansRailroad Co. v. Burden,9 the Texas
Supreme Court had ruled that "where there is evidence upon an issue
and there is no evidence to the contrary, then the jury has not the
right to disregard the undisputed evidence and decide such issue in
accordance with their wishes." 20 In Burden, this exception was applied
to the testimony of a disinterested witness. 2' Decades later, Texas
appellate courts expanded the concept by applying the same
14. See, e.g., CTrI Priesmeyer, Inc. v. K & 0 Ltd. P'ship, 164 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
15. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982).
16. See Dorsaneo, supra note 7, at 1503.
17. Id. at 1504.
18. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965) ("Factual insufficiency of the
evidence does not... authorize the court to disregard the finding entirely or make a
contrary finding in entering final judgment for one of the parties.").
19. 146 Tex. 109, 203 S.W.2d 522 (1947).
20. Id. at 123, 203 S.W.2d at 530; see also Grand Fraternity v. Melton, 102 Tex. 399,
402, 117 S.W. 788, 789 (Tex. 1909) ("The jury were the judges of the credibility of
witnesses; but they had not the right to arbitrarily reject the evidence of an unimpeached
witness, against whom there was no discrediting fact or circumstance.").
21. Burden, 146 Tex. at 130-31,203 S.W.2d at 534 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
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undisputed evidence concept to both disinterested and interested
witnesses22 as long as the testimony was clear, direct and positive, free
from contradictions, inaccuracies and circumstances tending to cast
suspicion on the evidence. 23 By the late 1990s, the Texas Supreme
Court had also noted somewhat cryptically that a legal sufficiency
review cannot "disregard undisputed
21 [circumstantial] evidence that
inference.
logical
one
only
allows of
How then should these developments be synthesized? An
important preliminary question concerning the scope of review is: To
what extent must an appellate court look at the "entire record" in
applying the legal sufficiency standard of review? First, from a
practical standpoint, it is necessary for a reviewing court to review the
entire record at the beginning of the review process to ascertain what
evidence favors the finding and what evidence is in derogation of the
finding, regardless of whether the finding is an affirmative one or a
negative one.2' Second, in applying the "scintilla rule" in Calvert's
situation (c), a reviewing court must make a threshold evaluation of
the reasonableness of inferences supporting a jury finding, before
disregarding contrary evidence.26 Because the reasonableness of an
inference under the "reasonable minds" test requires a consideration
of all of the circumstantial evidence that the jury was authorized to
give credence, the entire record is reviewed to determine the
reasonableness of the inference.27
To recapitulate: The process must begin with a review of the
entire record to identify favorable direct and circumstantial evidence.
Once this evidence is identified, a reviewing court must determine
whether inferences in support of a finding are reasonable ones under

22. Schwartz v. Pinnacle Commc'ns, 944 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no writ).
23. Id.
24. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 51 n.1 (Tex. 1997); see also St.
Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 519-20 (Tex. 2002). Because the totality of the
circumstantial evidence must be considered to evaluate whether an inference drawn from
the circumstances is reasonable, this cryptic ruling probably only means that if undisputed
evidence leads to only one reasonable inference, that inference cannot be disregarded and
maybe is conclusive.
25. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).
26. See id.; see also Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)
(Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
27. See Lozano, 52 S.W.3d at 149 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 166
(Baker, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Simmons & Simmons Constr. Co. v. Rea,
155 Tex. 353, 359-60, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1955); Seymour v. Am. Engine & Grinding Co.,
956 S.W.2d 49, 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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the totality of the circumstantial evidence.' If the circumstances
themselves are disputed, a reviewing court may not consider a
circumstance in derogation of an inference made by the jury, unless
the unfavorable circumstantial evidence is itself undisputed, because
the jury may determine the circumstances like any other fact
question. 29 Finally, in order to view the direct and circumstantial
evidence in the most favorable light in support of the finding,
unfavorable direct evidence and unfavorable reasonable inferences
must be disregarded by the reviewing court, unless the evidence
cannot be disregarded because it is undisputed direct evidence or
undisputed circumstantial evidence that allows only one logical
inference.'
The apparent complexity of the legal sufficiency review process
described above is somewhat misleading because individual cases
commonly do not require application of each component of the
review process. The following four examples illustrate how the
process should work in typical cases. The first two examples present
no difficulties. The third and fourth examples involve more
complexity because the issue to be determined rests on circumstantial
evidence and the possible presence of undisputed evidence that the
jury may be bound to consider:
* If the determination of an ultimate fact involves a
clash in the direct evidence, whether the direct
evidence that favors the finding made by the jury is
legally sufficient evidence should be determined by a
reviewing court without regard to the direct evidence
favoring the opposite finding. In this situation,
because a conflict in the direct evidence creates a
classic jury question about the disputed issue, a
reviewing court should assess the sufficiency of the
direct evidence favoring the finding without
comparing it with conflicting evidence.
* If evidence on an issue is undisputed, both the jury
and a reviewing court must credit that evidence and it
may determine an ultimate fact and the outcome of a
case as a matter of law.
* If an ultimate fact question involves circumstantial
28. Texas courts use a variety of tests to evaluate the reasonableness of inferences.
See, e.g., Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 & n.8 (Tex. 2003): see also
Lozano, 52 S.W.3d at 148-49 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
29. See ln re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
30. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513,519-20 (Tex. 2002).
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evidence and no direct evidence favors the finding
made by the jury, the totality of the circumstances,
minus any disputed circumstance in derogation of the
finding, must be reviewed to determine if a
reasonable inference in support of the finding can be
drawn from the evidence. If the inference is a
reasonable one, a reviewing court should ultimately
disregard opposing direct evidence and opposing
inferences, whether they are reasonable or not.
If the ultimate fact question involves circumstantial
evidence, but undisputed evidence exists that the jury
is bound to credit and that evidence is in derogation
of an otherwise reasonable inference that supports a
finding, the undisputed evidence cannot be
disregarded by a reviewing court and the undisputed
evidence may make the first inference and the jury's
finding unreasonable or legally immaterial.32
Relationship to FederalPractice

B.

A similar methodology has been embraced by the United States
Supreme Court in one of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's most
important opinions. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,33
the Court addressed and attempted to resolve differences concerning
the scope of review that have existed for more than thirty years
among the federal circuits. 34 Reeves is an age discrimination case in
which a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district
court judgment, based on a jury's verdict of willful discrimination on
the ground that the verdict was not supported by probative evidence.35
The court of appeals applied the Fifth Circuit's standard of whole
record review established in Boeing Co. v. Shipman,36 which requires a
reviewing court to consider all of the evidence at all stages of the
31.

Cf. Axelrad v. Jackson, 142 S.W.2d 418, 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

2004, pet. filed) ("purported inference from circumstantial evidence" can be "patently
unreasonable... when direct evidence trumps and supervenes the purported inference").
32. See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castafieda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 205-06 (Tex. 1998)
(Gonzalez, J., dissenting); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex.
2005).
33. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
34. Id. at 140; see also Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting).
35. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
36. 411 F.2d 365, 374-77 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled by Gautreaux v.
Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997).
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evidentiary review process "but in the light and with all reasonable
inferences most favorable to the party" in whose favor the finding was
made.37 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals for
misapplying the evidentiary review standard to the evidence.38

The Supreme Court recognized that some federal decisions have
stated that the scope of judicial review is limited to the evidence
favorable to the nonmoving party,39 while most hold that review

extends to the entire record. ' But the Court regarded this distinction
as "more semantic than real." 1 Although the Court did not explicitly

repudiate the Shipman review standard, it explained further that,
while review of all of the evidence is required to determine a motion

for judgment as a matter of law, the trial judge is required to give
credence to the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to
support the finding and to disregard all contrary evidence that the jury
was not required to believe. 2

The opinion explains the Court's methodology in clear terms:
[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations
or weigh
the evidence.
"Credibility
37.
38.

Id. at 374.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149. The Supreme Court explained:
In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the
jury's verdict, the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review .... [T]he
court disregarded critical evidence favorable to petitioner-namely, the evidence
supporting petitioner's prima facie case and undermining respondent's
nondiscriminatory explanation. The court also failed to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of petitioner. For instance, while acknowledging "the
potentially damning nature" of [a supervisor's] age-related comments, the court
discounted them on the ground that they "were not made in the direct context of
Reeves's termination." And the court discredited petitioner's evidence that [the
supervisor] was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there
was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other decision makers were
motivated by age." Moreover, the other evidence on which the court relied-that
Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent
employed many managers over age 50-although relevant, is certainly not
dispositive. In concluding that these circumstances so overwhelmed the evidence
favoring petitioner that no rational trier of fact could have found that petitioner
was fired because of his age, the Court of Appeals impermissibly substituted its
judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the jury's.
Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 149 (citing Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir.
1996), abrogated by Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149; Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 567
(8th Cir. 1967), abrogatedby Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149).
40. Id. at 149-50 (citing Tate v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 1433, 1435-36
(11th Cir. 1993); Shipman, 411 F.2d at 374).
41. Id. at 150.
42. Id.
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determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge." Thus, although the court should review the
record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the
moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the
court should give credence to the evidence favoring the
nonmovant as well as that "evidence supporting the moving
party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the
extent that [it] comes from disinterested witnesses."43
Taken at face value, the Supreme Court reconciled the conflicting
circuit decisions by restricting whole record review to the first part of
the review process.'
III. REASSESSING THE TRADITIONAL SCOPE OF REVIEW
Preponderanceof the Evidence Cases

A.

In City of Keller v. Wilson, the Texas Supreme Court reassessed
the scope of legal sufficiency review for civil cases controlled by the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.45 Recognizing that
the limited scope of review formula expressed in Judge Calvert's 1960
law review article does not go far enough because it does not take into
account evidence that the jury is required to credit, the court
recapitulated the legal sufficiency review standard in the following
terms:
The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the
evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded
people to reach the verdict under review. Whether a reviewing
court begins by considering all the evidence or only the evidence
supporting the verdict, legal-sufficiency review in the proper
light must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could,
and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could

43.

Id. at 150-51 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);

9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2529 at 300 (2d ed. 1995)) (citations omitted).

44. Despite the unmistakable clarity of the Reeves opinion, some commentators and
federal courts have balked at accepting it. See Steven Alan Childress, Taking Jury Verdicts
Seriously, 54 SMU L. REV. 1739, 1741-47 (2001) (arguing that the rule announced in
Reeves is unnecessary and creates a puzzling and problematic precedent for courts to
follow). But see David Crump, Jury Review After Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.: A Four-Step Algorithm, 54 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1749-54 (2001) (stating that the Reeves
standard gives a more coherent statement of the principles governing judicial review).
45. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809-10 (Tex. 2005).
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not.46

This recapitulation is helpful because (i) it reinforces the
principal characteristic of the traditional scope of review, i.e., that
evidence contrary to the verdict must be disregarded in assessing the
legal sufficiency of the evidence17 and (ii) because it recognizes that
"contrary evidence" cannot be disregarded when "reasonable jurors
could not" do So. But, in contrast to the federal scope of review in
the Reeves opinion, the court's recapitulation does not itself clearly

define what "contrary evidence". "reasonable jurors could not"
disregard, even though that is a principal analytical difficulty.
The balance of the court's opinion must be examined to discern
what cannot properly be disregarded by jurors or by reviewing courts.
The court states that reviewing courts and "[j]urors cannot ignore
undisputed testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible,
free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been
'
readily controverted."49
The opinion also explains that reviewing
courts cannot "disregard undisputed evidence that allows of only one

logical inference,"5° and it affirms that a party's judicial admissions
may conclusively establish a matter against that party.'
Beyond these familiar principles, the court's opinion identifies a

number of other situations in which contrary evidence cannot be
disregarded, including the following:
0

Material Contextual Evidence52

46. Id. at 827. Justice Brister's opinion, as reflected in this quotation, interprets the
traditional scope of review to require a reviewing court to disregard "contrary evidence" at
the beginning of the legal sufficiency review. But, as explained above, it is necessary to
review the entire record at the threshold to decide what evidence favors the finding and
what evidence is contrary to the finding. There is no other sensible way to proceed.
47. Justice Brister's opinion plainly recognizes that a reviewing court ultimately must
disregard contrary evidence, if a reasonable jury could do so. Id. at 811. Not all procedural
systems take this sensible approach to legal sufficiency review. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled by Gautreaux v.
Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997). For a critical evaluation of the Shipman
standard and scope of review, see William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial
by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1717-18 (2001).
48. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
49. Id. at 820.
50. Id. at 814.
51. Id. at 815.
52. Id. at 811-12.
[I]f evidence may be legally sufficient in one context but insufficient in another,
the context cannot be disregarded even if that means rendering judgment
contrary to the jury's verdict. Either "evidence contrary to the verdict" must be
defined to exclude material contextual evidence, or it must be an exception to the
general rule.
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"

*
*
*
"

Competency Evidence53
Circumstantial Equal Evidence54
Conclusive Evidence55
56
Consciousness Evidence
Clear and Convincing Evidence57

Each of these categories requires evaluation. In doing so, it is
important to remember that jurors are required to listen to and to
consider all of the evidence. Justice Scott Brister's majority opinion in

City of Keller sensibly explains that jurors may resolve factual disputes
and draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence so that
they may decide what happened and answer mixed questions of law
and fact concerning liability and damages. 8 In this process, contrary
direct evidence and inferences may be disregarded when it is
reasonable for jurors to do so under the evidence. 9 "Jurors are the
sole judges of the credibility of witnesses" 6 as long as "'[t]he jury's

decisions regarding credibility [are] reasonable.' 6' Even if testimonial
evidence is undisputed, it is ordinarily "the province of the jury to
draw from it whatever inferences they wish, so long as more than one
is possible," and reviewing courts "must assume jurors made all
inferences in favor of their verdict if reasonable minds could, and
Id. at 812.
53. Id. at 812-13. "[E]vidence that might be 'some evidence' when considered in
isolation is nevertheless rendered 'no evidence' when contrary evidence shows it to be
incompetent. Again, such evidence cannot be disregarded; it must be an exception either to
the exclusive standard of review or to the definition of contrary evidence." Id. at 813.
54. Id. at 813-14. "[W]hen the circumstantial evidence of a vital fact is meager, a
reviewing court must consider not just favorable but all the circumstantial evidence, and
competing inferences as well" to determine whether the favorable inference is a reasonable
one. Id. at 814.
55. Id. at 814-17. "Most often, undisputed contrary evidence becomes conclusive
(and thus cannot be disregarded) when it concerns physical facts that cannot be denied."
Id. at 815. "It is impossible to define precisely when undisputed evidence becomes
conclusive." Id. "[P]roper review also prevents jurors from substituting their opinions for
undisputed truth." Id. at 817.
56. Id. at 817-18. ("Reviewing courts assessing evidence of conscious indifference
cannot disregard part of what a party was conscious of.")
57. Id. "[W]e have held that a legal sufficiency review must consider all the evidence
(not just that favoring the verdict) in reviewing cases of parental termination, defamation,
and punitive damages. In such cases, again, evidence contrary to a verdict cannot be
disregarded." Id. (footnotes omitted).
58. Id. at 819-20.
59. Id. at 820.
60. Id. at 819.
61. Id. at 820 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 599 (Tex. 2002)) (alteration
in original).
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disregard all other inferences in their legal sufficiency review."6 2
Hence, the court's new categories concern not only evidence that
jurors must consider but also evidence a reviewing court should not
disregard in conducting a legal sufficiency review.
1.

MaterialContextual Evidence

"[I]f evidence may be legally sufficient in one context but
insufficient in another, the context cannot be disregarded even if that
means rendering judgment contrary to the jury's verdict." 63 For
example, the court explains that the relationship of the parties, the
condition of the plaintiff, and other contextual circumstances may be
considered in determining whether a defendant's actions were
sufficiently outrageous to support a judgment for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. '
The inclusion of "material contextual evidence" in the scope of
no evidence review makes sense and is consistent with the rule that
the totality of the circumstantial evidence must be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of an inference as long as the evidence
is undisputed or indisputable under the laws of science. Otherwise,
because jurors may resolve factual disputes, a reviewing court should
conclude that the jury resolved a dispute about the context in favor of
its verdict and disregard unfavorable contextual evidence while.
conducting a legal sufficiency review. Viewed this way, material
contextual evidence does not constitute a distinct category of evidence
that jurors and reviewing courts must credit.
2.

Competency Evidence

The court also sensibly explains that evidence showing that other
evidence supporting the verdict is incompetent cannot be ignored in
assessing the probative value of lay or expert testimony." For
example, evidence showing that an expert witness-whose opinion
supports a finding-is unqualified to give an opinion or that there is
no scientific basis for an opinion, cannot be disregarded by a
reviewing court. 66

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

821.
812.
811-12.
812-13.
813.
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CircumstantialEqual Evidence

Similarly, "when the circumstantial evidence of a vital fact is
meager, a reviewing court must consider not just favorable but all the
circumstantial evidence, and competing inferences as well." 67 For
example, "when injury or death occurs without eyewitnesses and only
meager circumstantial evidence suggests what happened, [courts]
cannot disregard other meager evidence of equally likely causes" in
evaluating the reasonableness of an inference in support of a jury
finding.6
With respect to the court's second and third categories, the
inclusion of competency evidence and circumstantial equal inferences
in the scope of review is desirable to enable a reviewing court to
properly evaluate the admissibility of the testimony or, in cases
involving meager circumstantial evidence, the reasonableness of an
inference. 69 But once those determinations have been made, there is
no other reason to include the evidence within the scope of review.
4.

Conclusive Evidence

Justice Brister's opinion explains that proper legal-sufficiency
review "prevents jurors from substituting their opinions for
undisputed truth., 70 In other words, conclusive evidence is dispositive
of the issue to which it is pertinent. Justice Brister's opinion also
explains that conclusive evidence is almost always undisputed and that
"[m]ost often, undisputed contrary evidence becomes conclusive (and
thus cannot be disregarded) when it concerns physical facts that
cannot be denied. Thus, no evidence supports an impaired-access
claim if it is undisputed that access remains along 90 percent of a
tract's frontage," or "when a party admits it is true.",71 In rare cases
disputed evidence may be conclusive, such as blood tests that
conclusively negate a man's paternity even though the mother testifies
that she did not have conjugal relations with anyone else during the
relevant time.7
67. Id. at 814.
68. Id.
69. This does not mean that the jury is required to select what a reviewing court
believes is the most reasonable inference. See Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex.
2001) (per curiam) (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
70. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817.
71. Id. at 815.
72. Id. at 816.
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Although "undisputed truth" ought to be "conclusive evidence,"
it is hard to identify in the face of conflicting evidence and inferences.
The closest a standard of review can come is to recognize that
evidence can be conclusive on an issue if it is both undisputed (or
indisputable) and dispositive under controlling legal principles. For
example, undisputed evidence of actual reliance on an expert report
may foreclose recovery73 under insurance bad faith law. Similarly,
probable cause may be established as a matter of law in a malicious
prosecution case if undisputed evidence shows all the objective
elements of a criminal offense have been committed, regardless of the
surrounding circumstances.4
Justice Brister's opinion sensibly recognizes that "[i]t is
impossible to define precisely when undisputed evidence becomes
conclusive."75 The opinion also identifies, in more traditional terms,
particular types of undisputed evidence that reasonable jurors must
give credence. Reasonable jurors and reviewing courts "cannot ignore
undisputed testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible,
free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been
readily controverted., 76 In addition, a legal sufficiency review cannot
"disregard undisputed [circumstantial] evidence that allows of only
one logical inference., 77 In these circumstances, as explained above in
Part II of this article, the undisputed evidence must be considered and
may be dispositive either because it makes the inference drawn by the
jury and the jury's finding unreasonable or legally immaterial.
5.

Consciousness Evidence

In legal sufficiency review of cases involving what a party knew or
why it took a certain course, the court's opinion states that a reviewing
court must consider "all of the surrounding facts, circumstances, and
conditions."' 78 Again, as in the case of material contextual evidence,
jurors can resolve conflicts in the direct or circumstantial evidence,
removing unfavorable evidence from the scope of review.
6.

Clear and Convincing Evidence

When the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence, the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castafieda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 194-95 (Tex. 1998).
See Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517-18 (Tex. 1997).
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 815.
Id. at 820.
Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 51 n.1 (Tex. 1997).
Id. at 75 (Hecht, J., concurring).
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court states that all of the evidence must be reviewed to determine
legal sufficiency. 79 However, as explained below, the scope of legal
sufficiency review in clear and convincing evidence cases does enable
the jury and a reviewing court to ultimately disregard all evidence that
a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved or found to have been
incredible. 8°
Fundamentally, the court's attempt to categorize types of
evidence that a reviewing court cannot disregard unnecessarily
complicates the analytical process. Aside from undisputed evidence
that both juries and reviewing courts are required to credit, there is no
other "contrary evidence" that "reasonable jurors could not"
disregard during the fact-finding process and that reviewing courts
should not disregard in the judicial review process. The remainder of
the court's opinion itself supports this conclusion by explaining that at
least the following three types of evidence must be ignored by
reviewing courts. 1
(1) Credibility Evidence
Reviewing courts must assume that jurors decided all credibility
questions in favor of the verdict if reasonable human beings could
have done so.' For example, if both drivers in a traffic accident testify
that they had the green light, an appellate court must presume that the
prevailing83 party had the green light and ignore evidence to the
contrary.
(2) Conflicting Evidence
Similarly, the reviewing court must assume that the jury resolved
all conflicts in accordance with its verdict and disregard conflicting
evidence.'
(3) Conflicting Inferences
A reviewing court must also assume that jurors made all
inferences in favor of their verdict if reasonable minds could have
done so, disregarding all other inferences.85
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817.
See text infra accompanying note 99.
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 818-21.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 821.
Id.
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The court's opinion concludes with the curious observation that
the same result will be reached whether a reviewing court begins a
legal sufficiency review by reviewing all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict (the "inclusive standard") or by
disregarding evidence that does not support the verdict (the
"exclusive standard").86 The court reasoned that in either case, "the
[reviewing] court must consider evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would
support it."" If the evidence allows of only one inference, neither
jurors nor the reviewing court may disregard it. The court stated:
Given these premises, it is no coincidence that the two
standards should reach the same result-indeed they must. Any
scope of appellate review smaller than what reasonable jurors
could believe will reverse some verdicts that are perfectly
reasonable; any scope of review larger than what reasonable
jurors could believe will affirm some verdicts that are not.8
The court characterized the advantages of each standard as
follows:
In sum, the exclusive standard is helpful in recognizing the
distinctive roles of judge and jury, intermediate and supreme
court. By contrast, the inclusive standard is helpful in
recognizing what courts actually do, and must be seen to do.
Both are
important; we should avoid choosing between them if
89
we can.
More significantly, however, because the court's inclusive
standard considers all of the evidence at the beginning of the review
process but ultimately disregards contrary evidence that the jury is not
required to credit, it preserves the distinctive roles of judges, juries,
and reviewing courts. The court's revised methodology does so
because it does not require the favorable evidence to be outweighed
by unfavorable evidence that jurors are not required to consider and
believe. In contrast, the type of whole record review used in some
jurisdictions allows or requires a reviewing court to consider all of the
evidence at each stage of the evidentiary review process. 90 As the
86, See id. at 823. As explained above, what the court calls the "exclusive standard" is
unworkable. It is also reasonably clear that Justice Calvert never intended contrary
evidence to be somehow disregarded at the threshold. See Simmons & Simmons Constr.
Co. v. Rea, 155 Tex. 353, 359-60, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1955).
87. City of Keller, 168 SW.3d at 822.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 827.
90. See supra Part II.A-B.
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Reeves opinion shows, this approach is flawed because it fails to
recognize that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for any
reviewing court to view the evidence in the most favorable light in
support of the verdict if the favorable evidence is not separated from
the unfavorable evidence that the jury is not required to credit.
Fundamentally, as Justice Brister's opinion recognizes, the more
aggressive form of whole record review used by these jurisdictions is a
poor policy choice because it may invade the jury's province.
B.

Clearand Convincing Evidence Cases

As stated in the City of Keller opinion, a different standard of
review applies if a required finding must be supported by clear and
convincing proof.9' Clear and convincing evidence means "the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established,"92 and applies to defamation cases,93 punitive
damages awards,9" cases involving the termination of parental rights,95
cases involving involuntary commitment of an individual to a mental
hospital, 9' and cases in which a statute requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence.
If the burden of proof in termination cases is by clear and
convincing evidence, an appellate court's legal sufficiency standard of
review "must take into consideration whether the evidence [was] such
that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
about the truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of
proof."'
If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record
evidence, a court determines that no reasonable factfinder could
form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be
proven is true, then that court must conclude that the evidence
is legally insufficient. Rendition of judgment... would generally
be required if there is legally insufficient evidence.98
In clear and convincing evidence cases, the scope of legal
sufficiency review has been more clearly defined by the Texas
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817.
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002).
See Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 610 (Tex. 2002).
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002).
See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979).
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66.
Id. at 266 (footnotes omitted).
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Supreme Court than the scope of review in cases in which the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies. The
procedure outlined by the court for conducting a no evidence review
in clear and convincing evidence cases is as follows:
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate
deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court
conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in
the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing
court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in
favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A
corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or
found to have been incredible. This does not mean that a court
must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding.
Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding
could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing
evidence.99
Thus, the scope of review that the court devised for clear and
convincing evidence cases is more complete than the one set forth in
Judge Calvert's article and more straightforward and informative than
the scope of review articulated in City of Keller. From my perspective,
the standard used in clear and convincing evidence cases is perfectly
compatible with the court's recapitulation of the scope of legal
sufficiency review in the City of Keller opinion for cases governed by
the preponderance of the evidence proof standard. Thus, I would go
further by adopting the same scope of review to all civil cases, but
without using the firm belief or conviction standard of review in
preponderance cases.' °°
There is no principled reason for a reviewing court to disregard
the existence of undisputed factual evidence concerning the
circumstances in conducting a legal sufficiency review in cases
controlled by the preponderance of the evidence proof standard, even
if the evidence by itself or in combination with other evidence would
contravene the jury's verdict. Under these circumstances, as suggested
in the fourth example set forth above,' the undisputed evidence may
99. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004) (quoting In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 266).
100. See authority cited supra note 27.
101. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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make an inference required to support the finding under review and
the finding itself unreasonable or legally immaterial, thereby requiring
a judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the finding. Inclusion
of undisputed evidence in the scope of review for cases governed by
the preponderance of the evidence proof standard makes sense
because evidentiary review of all of the undisputed facts and
circumstances is necessary for the jury to draw inferences from the
totality of the evidence in resolving mixed questions of law and fact,
and because undisputed evidence can be conclusive under substantive
legal principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
Texas appellate courts have conscientiously adhered to standards
of legal and factual sufficiency review for many years. Because those
standards establish and govern the relationships between judges,
juries and reviewing courts, they are of enormous importance to the
principled operation of any legal system that pretends to be governed
by legal principles rather than a desire to achieve particular results.
Nonetheless, periodic reexamination of the standards is necessary to
ensure that they match what principled courts do and to give better
guidance to the bench and bar.
The Texas Supreme Court's recapitulation of the scope of legal
sufficiency review establishes that Judge Calvert's 1960 formulation
does not go far enough because it does not explicitly recognize that
reasonable juries and reviewing courts cannot fail to consider
particular kinds of direct and circumstantial evidence in conducting a
legal sufficiency review. Although a reviewing court must assume that
a jury resolved disputed facts in favor of its verdict if a reasonable fact
finder could do so and must disregard all contrary evidence,
undisputed evidence that does not support the verdict should not be
disregarded. Such evidence must be considered to properly determine
the reasonableness of inferences and because the undisputed evidence
may be conclusive.

